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Abstract
The gendered implications of COVID-19, in particular in terms of gender-based 
violence and the gendered division of care work, have secured some prominence, 
and ignited discussion about prospects for a ‘feminist recovery’. In international 
law terms, feminist calls for a response to the pandemic have privileged the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC), conditioned—I argue—by two decades of the 
pursuit of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda through the UNSC. The 
deficiencies of the UNSC response, as characterised by the Resolution 2532 adopted 
to address the pandemic, manifest yet again the identified deficiencies of the WPS 
agenda at the UNSC, namely fragmentation, securitisation, efficacy and legitimacy. 
What Resolution 2532 does bring, however, is new clarity about the underlying rea-
sons for the repeated and enduring nature of these deficiencies at the UNSC. Spe-
cifically, the COVID-19 ‘crisis’ is powerful in exposing the deficiencies of the cri-
sis framework in which the UNSC operates. My reflections draw on insights from 
Hilary Charlesworth’s seminal contribution ‘International Law: A Discipline of 
Crisis’  to argue that, instead of conceding the ‘crisis’ framework to the pandemic 
by prioritising the UNSC, a ‘feminist recovery’ must instead follow Charlesworth’s 
exhortation to refocus on an international law of the everyday.
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In this brief reflection, I want to suggest that the dynamics around COVID-19, spe-
cifically the delay and inaction of the United Nations Security Council (hereafter 
‘Security Council’) in responding to the pandemic, may have longer term impli-
cations for feminist engagement with international law. Thus, the way that much 
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feminist engagement tends to privilege the Security Council within global govern-
ance may be coming to an end (Otto 2009).
The gendered implications of COVID-19, most notably in terms of increased 
exposure to gender-based violence (see for example, Neetu et al. 2020) and the gen-
dered division of increased care work (see for example, Power 2020), have secured 
considerable prominence in public debate and in global governance discussions 
about the pandemic. Indeed, if we look at the United Nations Secretary-General 
(hereafter ‘Secretary-General’), he accompanied his call for a global ceasefire1 with 
a call to end gender-based violence and called on governments to ensure peace at 
homes around the world and to put women’s safety first as they respond to the pan-
demic.2 The centrality of gender relations does evidence some success of feminist 
messages in international law and global governance. Indeed this prominence has, 
more optimistically, led to calls for a feminist recovery from the pandemic.3 As 
someone who works primarily on gender and conflict in international law, what has 
been interesting to me about feminist responses and engagement around the pan-
demic and international law is this central positioning of the Security Council in 
many of those feminist calls for response and change. For example, Madeleine Rees, 
the Secretary-General of Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, has 
written a widely circulated call on the Security Council to ‘do something’: “What 
on earth is the Security Council doing?”, she asks.4 The NGO Working Group on 
Women, Peace and Security issued a joint statement calling on the Security Council 
for a resolution to address the pandemic.5 The Group of Women Leaders Voices for 
Change and Inclusion—which includes a number of prominent international women 
leaders such as Helen Clark, Margot Wallström, Navi Pillay and others—wrote an 
open letter to the Security Council President again calling for a resolution on the 
pandemic.6
What manifold feminist calls to action from the Security Council reveal, first, 
is the central position of the Security Council in feminist engagement with inter-
national law. And, of course, that impulse to look to the Security Council is not 
new with the pandemic. Rather, that impulse is grounded in over two decades 
of feminist prioritisation of the Security Council as the institution best placed to 
advance women’s rights or participation in an insecure world (see generally, Cock-
burn 2007; Anderlini 2007). That dynamic is epitomised by campaigns for Secu-
rity Council Resolution 1325 and subsequent resolutions dealing with this Women, 
Peace and Security agenda,7 that marks its 20th anniversary this year. Admittedly, 
1 See United Nations Secretary-General (2020).
2 Ibid. See also, Guterres (2020).
3 See Gender Development Network (2020), Morgan (2020), Rigby (2020).
4 See Rees (2020).
5 See The NGO Working Group on Women Peace and Security (2020).
6 See Group of Women Leaders, Voices for Change and Inclusion (2020).
7 UNSC Res 1325 (2000) [on women and peace and security] S/RES/1325 (31 October 2000); UNSC 
Res 1820 (2008) [on acts of sexual violence against civilians in armed conflicts] S/RES/1820 (19 
June 2008); UNSC Res 1888 (2009) [on acts of sexual violence against civilians in armed conflicts] 
S/RES/1888 (30 September 2009); UNSC Res 1889 (2009) [on women and peace and security] S/
RES/1889 (5 October 2009); UNSC Res 1960 (2010) [on women and peace and security] S/RES/1960 
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feminist engagement with the Security Council has also long been characterised by 
ambivalence. This ambivalence is variously grounded in suspicion of its inherently 
militarist and selective composition and function (see for example, Otto 2009); the 
legitimacy deficits that result (see for example, Otto 2010); sober assessment about 
limited material gains from engagement to date8; as well as more fundamental ques-
tioning of the so-called ‘will to power’ of feminist engagement with institutions such 
as the Security Council (see generally, Halley et al. 2019; Otto 2019). Nevertheless, 
that this multifaceted ambivalence has not previously grounded a feminist rejection 
of the institution says much about the enduring place of the Security Council in fem-
inist strategy in international law (O’Rourke 2017). Second, interestingly, the turn 
to the Security Council to respond to the pandemic also reveals how the Security 
Council’s inaction—principally the failure and delay around adopting a resolution—
is read by many feminist actors as an unqualified failure of the Security Council to 
meet its mandate to respond to threats to international peace and security.
We now have a resolution: Resolution 2532 was adopted on 1 July 2020 by the 
Security Council to respond to the pandemic.9 Resolution 2532 reiterates the Sec-
retary-General’s call for a global ceasefire in response to the pandemic: “a durable 
humanitarian pause for at least 90 consecutive days”, in order to enable delivery of 
humanitarian assistance,10 but then establishes an exception to this call for military 
operations against ISIL, Al Qaeda, Al Nusra Front and associated groups, as well as 
all terrorist groups so designated by the Security Council.11 The resolution requests 
the Secretary-General to help ensure that all relevant parts of the UN, including UN 
country teams, accelerate their response to the pandemic12; and to update the Secu-
rity Council on such efforts, in particular in terms of any impact on the ability of 
peacekeeping operations and Special Political Missions mandated by the Security 
Council to discharge their mandates.13 With further regard to peacekeeping opera-
tions, the Secretary-General is asked to instruct peacekeeping operations to support 
host country authorities to ensure humanitarian access to internally displaced per-
sons (IDPs) and refugees; and for the Secretary-General and member states to take 
all appropriate steps to protect the safety, security and health of all UN personnel in 
UN peace operations, while maintaining the continuity of such operations.14 In the 
final substantive operative paragraph, the resolution:
8 See Werner et al. (2020).
9 UNSC Res 2532 (2020) [on cessation of hostilities in the context of the coronavirus disease (COVID-
19) pandemic] S/RES/2532 (1 July 2020).
10 Ibid, operative paragraphs 1 and 2.
11 Ibid, operative paragraph 3.
12 Ibid, operative paragraph 4.
13 Ibid, operative paragraph 5.
14 Ibid, operative paragraph 6.
(16 December 2010); UNSC Res 2106 (2013) [on sexual violence in armed conflict] S/RES/2106 (24 
June 2013); UNSC Res 2122 (2013) [on women and peace and security] S/RES/2122 (18 October 2013); 
UNSC Res 2242 (2015) [on women and peace and security] S/RES/2242 (13 October 2015); UNSC Res 
2467 (2019) [on conflict-related sexual violence] S/RES/2467 (23 April 2019); UNSC Res 2493 (2019) 




Acknowledges the critical role that women are playing in COVID-19 response 
efforts, as well as the disproportionate negative impact of the pandemic, nota-
bly the socio-economic impact, on women and girls, children, refugees, inter-
nally displaced persons, older persons and persons with disabilities, and calls 
for concrete actions to minimize this impact and ensure the full, equal and 
meaningful participation of women and youth in the development and imple-
mentation of an adequate and sustainable response to the pandemic;15
I argue that the deficiencies of Resolution 2532, although certainly not about femi-
nist engagement, have sharpened dilemmas that are confronted by feminist engage-
ment with international law and especially the Security Council. These are dilem-
mas that have been present for some time. For example, the resolution and its failure 
to even reference the World Health Organization (WHO)—in contrast to the reso-
lution on COVID-19 of the UN General Assembly16—even in the preamble, does 
raise questions about the purpose of the resolution. To borrow from Benvenisti and 
Downs (2017): is Resolution 2532 a type of ‘fragmentation strategy’, whereby the 
institution that actually has resources and authority to lead a global response to the 
pandemic is distracted from by the Security Council, including the displacement 
of attention and resources from the WHO to the Security Council? There is also a 
question of whether the Security Council advances its mission creep beyond threats 
to international peace and security with this resolution (Otto 2009). Further, does 
the Security Council adopting a resolution around a pandemic reflect the securitisa-
tion of a public health issue (O’Rourke and Swaine 2018, 171)?
Even assessing the resolution on the narrowest possible feminist terms, namely 
reference to women and the WPS agenda, the results are doubtful. Whilst Resolu-
tion 2532 does—in its final operative paragraph—reference women,17 the resolution 
does not reference the WPS resolutions at all. In that sense, therefore, the Security 
Council has opted not to endorse its existing normative commitments around gender 
equality, nor to activate its infrastructure to advance those normative commitments 
through the resolution. Ultimately, the weaknesses of the resolution mean that it is 
largely rhetorical. Resolution 2532 thereby reaffirms suspicion that the adoption of 
the resolution was really—rather than being about providing leadership for a global 
response to the pandemic—in fact about the Security Council and its legitimacy and 
being seen to do something to justify its existence and activities.
These problems with the Security Council as manifested through Resolution 2532 
–fragmentation, securitisation, efficacy and legitimacy—are familiar problems in 
feminist engagement with the Security Council. In fact, as noted above, these prob-
lems reflect how much feminist analysis characterises the WPS resolutions (see gen-
erally, Davies and True 2019). What Resolution 2532 does arguably bring, however, 
is new clarity about the underlying reasons for the repeated and enduring nature 
of these problems at the Security Council. Specifically, the COVID-19 ‘crisis’ is 
17 UNSC Res 2532 (2020), operative paragraph 7.
15 Ibid, operative paragraph 7.
16 UNGA Res 74/270 (2020) ‘Global solidarity to fight the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19)’.
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powerful in exposing the deficiencies of the crisis framework in which the Security 
Council operates. Critique of international law’s crisis tendency is not new. It was 
articulated most forcefully in 2002 by Hilary Charlesworth in Modern Law Review 
in her seminal article, ‘International Law: A Discipline of Crisis.’ The article’s cen-
tral argument is that the focus of international lawyers on crisis shields the discipline 
from more fundamental questions and inquiries (Charlesworth 2002). This is a cri-
tique that has acquired further powerful resonance in light of the pandemic.
To reprise Charlesworth’s (2002, 382) key arguments: she talks about the con-
tentious construction of crisis and the ethical costs of crises. In terms of the con-
tentious construction of crisis, she talks about the negotiability of facts. Therefore, 
the crisis model in international law tends to assume that elements of the crisis are 
‘facts’ that are uncontroversial and ripe for picking. But of course, any critical read-
ing of international law will reveal that that is not the case. For example, in the UK, 
tabloid newspaper headlines talked about the ‘first’ lockdown killings, referring to 
women who are killed by violent male partners under lockdown. However, domestic 
homicide is a tragically familiar occurrence: two women a week die in the UK at the 
hands of male partners.18 The primary framing of such killings as a consequence of 
the pandemic obscures their roots in gendered violence and inequality.
Next, Charlesworth (2002, 384) talks about the lack of analytical progress due 
to the ‘crisis’ framing of international law. By treating the crisis as ‘new’, we redis-
cover issues constantly and analyse them without building on past scholarship or 
learning. To illustrate, COVID-19 is characterised as a new problem, rather than a 
manifestation of, for example, entrenched capitalist development models and long-
standing indiscriminate damage to the natural world. Charlesworth (2002, 384) 
also talks about the problem of ‘thin description.’ Thus, the crisis model leads us 
to concentrate on a single event or series of events and to often miss the larger pic-
ture. Therefore the core ‘problem’ of the pandemic becomes about the shortage of 
Personal Protective Equipment or China’s lack of disclosure, rather than the long-
running immiseration of public services and the social state that the pandemic has 
exposed.
Further, in terms of ‘the ethical cost of crisis,’ the focus on crisis narrows the 
agenda of international law, according to Charlesworth (2002, 386). Therefore, the 
only possible course of action in the face of crisis is to act, or not to act: either the 
Security Council adopts a resolution or it does not. But of course, there is so much 
between those two poles. In addition, this narrow agenda—in which the Security 
Council either adopts a resolution or fails to adopt a resolution—shields the ulti-
mate resolution from critique. Further, the characterisation of crises and the Security 
Council role means that, whilst the Security Council can mandate its country mis-
sions to account for COVID-19,19 the Security Council cannot address any of the 
structural underpinning problems of the pandemic and its causes. Finally, Charles-
worth (2002, 388) condemns the silencing effect of the crisis and how the crisis 
18 See Office for National Statistics (2019).
19 UNSC Res 2532 (2020) [on cessation of hostilities in the context of the coronavirus disease (COVID-
19) pandemic] S/RES/2532 (1 July 2020): 4, 6.
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is silencing many other voices and priorities. Consider, for example, what China 
is attempting to do in Hong Kong under the cover of the pandemic.20 Ultimately, 
whilst feminist prioritisation of the Security Council for two decades plus has pre-
conditioned and predetermined the approach to the Security Council for COVID-19, 
this feminist engagement further privileges the Security Council in international law 
and concedes the crisis characterisation of the pandemic.
As we are learning, the crisis characterisation is, in fact, antithetical to a feminist 
recovery. And here, instead of looking to international actors, I look locally to Bel-
fast where women’s organisations and feminist actors have developed a truly extraor-
dinary ‘Feminist Recovery Plan’ for the pandemic.21 This initiative, rather than 
emphasising the crisis and discontinuity caused by COVID-19, instead emphasises 
the social and economic precarity that characterised the pre-COVID-19 world and 
that has predetermined the gendered vulnerabilities to which international organisa-
tions are now calling attention. The Plan defines a feminist recovery accordingly:
This plan will use a mix of political and economic policy-making recommen-
dations to advocate for a feminist recovery to COVID-19 with the aim of not 
only avoiding deepening gender inequalities through recovery planning, but 
also tackling the gendered inequalities that already exist in our society.22
This framing is in stark contrast to the dominant approach of international law, par-
ticularly as imagined by the Security Council. As the Feminist Recovery Plan makes 
clear, individuals and families—and yes, many women—were in ‘crisis’ long before 
this pandemic hit. Moreover, the focus on pre-existing precarity has revealed the 
interconnections of economic insecurity and political and social insecurity more 
broadly. Thus, the pandemic does present a unique juncture in one essential respect: 
there is a growing awareness that nothing—the economy, education, health—works 
without suitable provision of care. If we are to follow Charlesworth’s exhortation 
to resist the allure of ‘crises’ and to refocus instead on an international law of the 
everyday, then there can surely be nothing more quotidian, yet essential, than care. 
The revaluation of care is a longstanding feminist project, in law and elsewhere, but 
without to date sustained and dedicated engagement by feminist international law-
yers. If, as I propose, COVID-19 and its crisis framing has exposed the impoverish-
ment of the Security Council as an agent for women’s rights and gender equality, 
and may yet inform a re-direction in feminist advocacy in the longer-term, then the 
refocusing and revaluing of care may yet provide the essential link between interna-
tional law and the everyday.
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